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L’appropriation néolibérale des discours modernes sur 
les besoins est aujourd’hui bien documentée. De même, 
de nombreuses voix se sont élevées pour dénoncer ce 
qu’elles appellent « la dictature des besoins », c’est-à-dire 
le monopole du pouvoir que détiennent les profession-
nels et gestionnaires de définir les besoins de ceux et 
celles auprès de qui ils interviennent. Cette objectivation 
des besoins fait immédiatement appel aux ressources 
d’experts, évacuant par le fait même toute ouverture 
à une approche prviliégiant la participation démocra-
tique. Ici « les besoins » s’ajoutent aux autres catégories 
construites et idéologiquement investies par les profes-
sionnels. En réaction à cela, les travailleurs sociaux ont 
été séduits par l’idée de suppléer aux approches basées 
sur les « besoins » des dynamiques d’intervention fondées 
sur les « droits ». Or, les « droits » et, surtout, les « droits 
humains » sont aussi des catégories de la modernité qui 
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tendent à être instruites et utilisables uniquement par des 
experts. Si nous acceptons maintenant de nous pencher 
sur les « droits humains » dans une perspective davantage 
postmoderne, nous sommes à même d’en « déplacer » 
le sens et d’appréhender la solidarité humaine au-delà 
des contraintes de la modernité. Pour inadéquate et 
potentiellement dangereuse que puisse être la catégorie 
des « droits humains », ces derniers peuvent toutefois 
fonder les pratiques d’intervention du travai social dans 
la mesure où ils engagent à des pratiques démocratiques. 
En ce sens, si les droits humains sont partie intégrante 
du projet d’une communauté de droits et de devoirs 
réciproques, et non des choses que peuvent détenir 
les individus, ils peuvent en effet s’imposer comme un 
levier puissant pour le renouvellement démocratique des 
 pratiques  d’intervention.
The way in which a discourse of human needs has been 
appropriated by neo-liberal perspectives within moder-
nity is well-documented. The construction and definition 
of “needs” by professionals has been criticised as “the 
dictatorship of needs”, and has readily excluded people 
other than professionals and managers from the defini-
tion of need. Need becomes objectified, something to be 
“assessed” by professionals using expert methodologies, 
rather than involving democratic participation. Here need 
becomes another excluding professional category, appar-
ently objective and value-free, but in reality ideological. 
Furthermore, the deficit approach inherent in the idea 
of “need” runs counter to the more positive “strengths” 
approach of social work. “Rights” as an alternative to 
“needs” is superficially a more empowering discourse, and 
moving from a needs-based to a rights-based approach is 
therefore intuitively seductive, and has evidently appealed 
to social workers. However, ideas of “rights”, and espe-
cially “human rights” are also embedded within moder-
nity and the privileging of the expert. The conventional 
discourse of human rights as defined by the UN or other 
legal bodies, applied universally, and protected through 
laws and legal institutions, is a negation of any demo-
cratic understanding of rights. “Human rights”, like need, 
thus becomes an objectified discourse of the powerful 
about the powerless. However the idea of human rights, 
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if constructed from within a more postmodern framing, 
has the potential to move our understanding of a shared 
humanity beyond the constraints of modernity. Thus 
human rights per se is an inadequate, and potentially 
dangerous, formulation for progressive social work, unless 
democratic participation is restored to the human rights 
project. If human rights are understood as being embedded 
in a community of reciprocal rights and responsibilities, 
rather than as “things” possessed by individuals, human 
rights from below can become a powerful framework for 
the democratic renewal of practice.
The democratic renewal of practices cannot, I would argue, be achieved 
without the accompanying democratic renewal of theory. Not only have prac-
tices been affected by the managerialist, evidence-based and fundamentally 
anti-democratic discourse of professional practice within modernity, but the 
very ideas and concepts on which that practice is based have similarly been 
appropriated. Accountability, for example, is now defined as accountability 
to managers, rather than accountability to those with whom we work, or to 
the wider community. Ethics have become a system of prescribed top-down, 
legalistic control, rather than a response of one human being to another. We 
need to work on breaking concepts and discourses, as well as practices, free 
from the constraints of managerialism. We need to change not only what 
we do, but how we think.
In this paper I want to examine initially needs, and then, in more detail, 
rights, as bases for human services, and to demonstrate that both are, by 
themselves, inadequate. It is, I will argue, the objectified and undemocratic 
nature of each that makes them not merely inadequate, but potentially 
oppressive and even dangerous. Sadly, much of the way in which rights and 
needs are taught to social work students reflects this objectification, and, in 
my experience of teaching both social work and human rights, these concepts 
are too often unexplored and accepted at face value within a positivist 
paradigm. I then want to suggest ways in which the idea of human rights 
might be reconstructed to make it compatible with the idea of the democratic 
renewal of practices. Thus the paper argues from a position that accepts the 
inadequacies of a positivist position, and instead argues from a position more 
consistent with a critical social science (Crotty, 1998).
A discourse of human needs, within modernity, has been characterised 
by a positivist construction of “need”, as something that exists in an objec-
tively identifiable and measurable way : need as noun rather than as verb. 
Human service professionals are commonly required to measure needs, 
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to do need assessments, to document and compare needs, and to establish 
what has to be done so that those needs can be met. This applies equally 
to individual/family work and to community work ; an individual, a family 
or a community is seen has “having” needs, which are to be identified and 
met. Such a positivist construction of human need ignores the philosophical 
complexity of the very idea of “need”, and treats it as non-problematic (Ife, 
2002). We thus fail to ask key questions in seeking to understand a situation 
and to act accordingly. For example, to talk about a need (e.g. I need food), 
rather than a problem (I am hungry), defines the problem in terms of its 
solution. The emphasis is on the provision of what is needed (how can I get 
food) rather than the subjective experience (what is it like to be hungry) or 
the cause of the problem (why am I hungry). This effectively depoliticises a 
problem, drawing attention away from the structural or discursive causes of 
that problem, and even from the subjective experience of that problem, and 
instead draws attention towards running around being busy and providing 
the “needed” solution. A discourse of need is a part of the process of defining 
problems as technical rather than political, and thus locating them outside 
the arena of democratic participation, and within the arena of technical 
expertise. This emphasis on technical, rational expertise extends, of course, 
well beyond the human services ; the economy has long been constructed 
in this way, as a result of which most people have little understanding of, or 
participation in, economic debates, and the field has been left to the self-
defined “experts” – the results of which are now being felt around the globe. 
But the parallel is instructive. Social need definers are little different from 
economists ; they have assumed for themselves the role of expert in defining 
the needs of people, and in doing so have developed a professional vocabulary 
and a set of professional practices that exclude those experiencing the “need”. 
As such it is far from the objectivity and value-neutrality that the language 
implies, but is fundamentally undemocratic and technocratic.
This critique of a needs discourse is, of course, not new. The idea of 
professionals as exercising “the dictatorship of needs” was well documented 
as far back as the 1980s by writers such as Feher, Heller and Markus (1983) 
(in the Marxist tradition) and also Ivan Illich (1977). Similarly, there has 
been from the 1970s a critique of positivism showing it to be far from value-
free, but rather as reinforcing the culture of the expert and disenfranchis-
ing the broader community (Fay, 1975). But even though the critique is 
well-established, there remains a strong trend for human needs to be seen 
in quasi-scientific terms, as objective, measurable, and the domain of the 
expert. Such positivism is alive and well in the welfare bureaucracies of both 
government and non-government sectors (Rees and Rodley, 1995).
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An important reaction to this was the impetus to take need definition 
out of the hands of the experts, by finding ways that people or communi-
ties could define needs for themselves : the democratisation of need. This 
has been the basis of much of the more progressive thinking in community 
development, which is at heart a process of helping communities themselves 
to define their needs and to work to have them met (Kenny, 1999 ; Ife, 2002). 
More progressive forms of social work have also sought to provide space for 
people to define needs for themselves (Allan, Pease and Briskman, 2003). 
This tradition has always been present in social work, and was inherent in 
the idea that social work was concerned with self-determination – though 
self-determination was often not defined in political terms – and it has now 
largely been eclipsed by the common obsession with outcomes, often defined 
before the social worker has even met the person or family concerned. In 
such a context, to talk about self-determination, an idea once viewed by 
Marxist social workers as hopelessly liberal (Powell, 2001), represents a 
radical departure from the dominant discourses of human services ; perhaps 
it is time to refocus on the idea of self-determination, but consciously moving 
beyond its conventional individualist liberal constraints to locate it as part 
of a broader politics of participation and transformation.
It is important, therefore, to note that “need” can be regarded in a 
more democratic and potentially progressive way, by seeing needs as defined 
or constructed, rather than as “existing”, and thereby drawing attention to 
the act of definition, seeing this as a political act, and recognising that the 
important questions are : who is doing the need defining, what are their 
interests reflected in that definition, on what information do they make 
that determination, has there been a process of negotiation leading to the 
need definition, what has been the role, if any, of the people who are seen 
as “having” the need, what is the apparent “problem” which the “need” is 
supposed to resolve, what other “needs” might address that problem, and 
so on (for a fuller discussion, see Ife, 2002, 2010). This has been the thrust 
of more considered thinking about human needs and social needs, though 
it remains a marginal view in the practice environment so dominated by 
managerialism, outcomes and evidence-based practice.
One way in which human services have sought to react to this problem, 
and to develop a more democratic and politically progressive form of practice, 
has been to move from a needs-based to a rights-based approach (Reichert, 
2003, 2007 ; Ife, 2008). This has had considerable intuitive appeal. The idea 
of rights implies, somehow, a more active role for the person concerned, and 
moves away from the “deficit” that is inherent in a needs-based approach. 
It is thus more consistent with the “strengths perspective” which has been 
influential in recent years (Saleeby, 2006). The idea of “human rights” has 
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become popular, and has been used to invest social practice with an appar-
ently progressive idea. It is worth noting that human rights represents, in 
the current political context of western societies, perhaps the only progres-
sive political discourse with widespread appeal and reasonable legitimacy. 
As socialism is apparently discredited (though in my view unjustly so), and 
anything identified too closely with “the left” is automatically suspect, 
human rights remains a legitimate discourse which can be used to pursue 
the aims of social justice, and broader ideas of a fair society. For this reason, 
human rights discourse, despite the problems associated with it, should not 
be dismissed lightly. The enthusiasm for human rights, held by many in the 
community and particularly by human service practitioners, can represent 
a powerful reassertion of human values in the face of neo-liberal market-
based ideologies, where the needs of economies are placed before the needs 
of people, and where people must suffer so that economies can flourish, 
rather than vice versa. For this reason, there is value in embracing human 
rights as a basis for practice, but this should not be done without critique 
and analysis. Yet to criticise human rights is potentially dangerous, as in the 
current climate it can simply reinforce the views of those who believe, with 
Bentham (2001), that human rights are “nonsense on stilts”, and should not 
be allowed to get in the way of the important business of creating wealth 
and ensuring political stability, by whatever means are necessary. A critique 
of human rights cannot occur in a political or ideological vacuum ; human 
rights are, by their very nature, political and ideological, despite the super-
ficially “non-political” stance taken by some human rights organisations 
such as Amnesty International. Critique is essential if human rights are to 
be conceptually robust, however among those who wish to advocate human 
rights as a basis for human service practice, there has been a remarkable lack 
of critique of the concept – indeed in some circles to offer such a critique is 
regarded as heresy – and a lack of willingness to engage with philosophical 
analysis and debate about the very idea of human rights, about which there 
is a substantial literature (Hayden, 2001 ; Campbell et al., 2001 ; Herbert, 
2003 ; Douzinas, 2000, 2007 ; Orend, 2002). Thus there has developed a gap 
between human rights theorists and human rights practitioners, a gap that 
needs to be bridged.
In this sense, rights have been treated the same way as needs, as if 
their nature and “existence” are non-problematic, and there is no place for 
critique or philosophical puzzlement. Like “needs”, the idea of human rights 
is thoroughly embedded within modernity, and has been constructed in such 
a way that it privileges the expert and marginalises democratic participation. 
There are two aspects of conventional human rights discourse that clearly 
epitomise this. The first is the common ascription of human rights as univer-
sal. Universality commonly implies the application of the same  construction 
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of human rights, and the same human rights regime, everywhere in the 
world, under the ideal of furthering something understood as a “common 
humanity”. Such a perspective, while intuitively appealing and rhetorically 
strong, readily masks cultural difference, and has been criticised as the impo-
sition of a western view of “humanity” on the rest of the world (Aziz, 1999 ; 
Pereira, 1997). This critique, of course, has been frequently misused to justify 
repressive regimes – for example in Burma, in Indonesia during the Suharto 
era, in China, and to a lesser extent in some other Asian countries – and to 
justify why they should not be held to account for their actions in suppressing 
political dissent. However, despite this, the critique of naive universalism in 
human rights remains important. The idea of a single, common humanity 
is very much an Enlightenment legacy (Carroll, 2004), and represents the 
humanist ideal which has been used as the justification for colonisation and 
the apparently benign “improvement” of subject peoples. Living at a time 
when the universal humanist ideal is eroding if not collapsing, something 
called “universal” human rights seems somewhat outdated, and not relevant 
for a world characterised by diversity and the “death of the meta-narrative”.
The other aspect of conventional human rights that is thoroughly 
embedded in modernity is the frequent identification of human rights with 
law (Douzinas, 2000, 2007). Human rights are seen as legislated, guaran-
teed in constitutions and bills of rights, and protected through legal mecha-
nisms. Law is seen as the pre-eminent human rights profession, and lawyers 
are commonly regarded as the human rights experts. In following such a 
human rights tradition, human service workers, such as social workers, have 
simply replicated their earlier openness to the seductiveness of the law as 
a paradigm for practice, through the application of such legal concepts as 
advocacy, contracts, justice, etc., without stopping to think about the way 
this affects their practice, and creates significant blind-spots in their percep-
tions of social problems or of how to work effectively with people. The law 
is, at least in western societies, constructed almost totally within modernity 
(Douzinas, 2000). It seeks to impose certainty, predictability, and its idea 
of “justice” is defined as procedural fairness. Although the idea of “all are 
equal before the law” is clearly a nonsense, this is still the ideal for which 
lawyers, and law reformers, constantly strive. The discursive construction, 
and the institutional operation, of law is typical of modernity’s search for 
certainty, and its desire to fit all human beings, despite their diversity, into 
a single moral and regulatory framework ; anything else would not serve the 
ends of “justice” as understood within the legal paradigm. Further, the law 
and the legal profession have been guilty of the same exclusive technocracy 
as was discussed above in relation to professional need definers ; they have 
made human rights a domain for the expert rather than the citizen, and have 
dressed it up in a jargon that effectively disenfranchises the majority of the 
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population. Laws are made and interpreted by elites remote from most of the 
citizenry, and even to plead your case in law requires an expert to do it for 
you : hardly a democratic and participatory form of human rights. Hence the 
identification of human rights with law, taken to its extreme in the dubious 
argument that all human rights must be justiciable and that if something 
cannot be justiciable it should not count as a human right, thoroughly locates 
human rights within a discourse of modernity and technocratic expertise 
(see Loughlin, 2001). If the postmodernists are correct, and modernity is 
losing its credibility, increasingly fractured by its own contradictions, then 
this is hardly an adequate formulation for human rights. An approach to 
human services based on human rights understood only in its legal, positivist 
and modernist sense, is both intellectually weak and also no more related to 
progressive social and political change than other discredited perspectives 
on social practice.
It is my belief that the idea of human rights can be rescued from moder-
nity’s constraints ; indeed that it is too important an idea to be allowed to 
erode along with the inevitable erosion of modernity. But this requires a 
reformulation of human rights, more along the lines of the theme of this con-
ference, the democratic renewal of practices, and my argument might indeed 
be characterised as a plea for the democratic renewal of human rights. Our 
idea of “the human” is strongly identified with the legacy of Enlightenment 
modernity (Carroll, 2004), and an alternative human rights can be based on 
a post-modern construction of the human and of “humanity”. A first task for 
such a reconstruction is to develop a more nuanced approach to universal-
ism. The world view of modernity has created a simple binary of universal/
relative, which has not served the ends of human rights well. A naïve univer-
salism is simply inappropriate for a world of diversity and complexity, while 
an equally naïve relativism can serve to negate any capacity to use human 
rights to reach across cultural, racial, religious, social and political differ-
ence. There is a clear need to transcend the universal/relative dichotomy, 
recognising that each is necessary to give meaning to the other, and that 
human rights are at the same time both universal and relative (Tascón and 
Ife, 2008) ; to hold that tension, and use it creatively, is a major challenge for 
human rights workers seeking to emerge from the intellectual straightjacket 
of positivist modernity. If human rights are about the recognition and recon-
struction of our “humanity” it is clear that we understand our humanity both 
in universal and contextual terms – as members of something we recognise 
as “the human race”, but define within specific and diverse cultures and 
communities – and so our humanity is both universal and contextual. To 
understand human rights in this way is a prerequisite for a more democratic 
human rights tradition.
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More significant for the democratic renewal of human rights, however, 
is to recognise the constraints of the top-down conventional legal approach, 
and to reconstruct a human rights based on a more democratic and participa-
tory perspective, emphasising the way human rights are defined through the 
lived experience, rather than through laws and conventions. I have called this 
approach “human rights from below” (Ife, 2010). This begins by addressing 
one of the fundamental contradictions of conventional human rights, that is, 
that human rights are defined in legislation, constitutions, bills of rights or 
conventions, that are drawn up by very small numbers of people – politicians, 
lawyers, academics, and so on – who are not representative of the general 
population. Such elites have assumed for themselves the right to define the 
rights of others, and this discursive control in itself represents a human 
rights abuse : they have denied people the right to define their rights for 
themselves, or to have a real voice in the construction of “universal” human 
rights. This is a central contradiction of conventional human rights, which 
must be addressed if human rights are to have meaning within the lived 
experience of people in diverse communities. For human services to adopt 
a human rights “model” of practice, based on this conventional top-down 
human rights discourse, is to side with the voices of the powerful, and to use 
the apparently progressive voice of human rights to reinforce discourses of 
oppression and inequality. An approach that incorporates “human rights 
from below” can be regarded as making a potentially more positive and 
emancipatory contribution to human service practice.
Such an approach to human rights locates participation, rather than 
law, at the core of the human rights agenda. In this sense, it becomes clearly 
identified with community development and with the project of democratic 
renewal ; the dilemmas of participation have been key concerns for commu-
nity workers for decades (Ife, 2002). However there is a more far-reaching 
way in which human rights is inevitably linked to human community, which 
lies in the connection between rights and responsibilities. This is an obvious 
and necessary connection ; human rights imply responsibilities, and any 
assertion of “my rights” implies that other actors (whether individuals, 
communities, institutions or the state) have responsibilities to ensure that 
my rights are realised and protected. An individual on a desert island has 
no rights, as there is nobody to accept the responsibilities that go with them. 
Rights, therefore, tie us to others, and imply a community of interlocking 
rights and duties (Gewirth, 1996). Human rights are thus inherently collec-
tive, contrary to the liberal individualism that so often is associated with a 
discourse of rights. They are, in reality, collectively owned and collectively 
exercised. For this reason, human rights require a community development 
perspective, and human rights work is necessarily community work.
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A perspective of human rights from below thus sees community, and 
democratic participation, at the centre of the idea of human rights. To this 
can be added the idea of human rights as part of a day-to-day lived experi-
ence. Our human interactions, in households, in work places, in shopping 
centres, on buses and trains, require us to make assumptions about our rights 
and the rights of others, and the responsibilities that go with them. We make 
these assumptions and share them with others ; it is what makes possible our 
orderly day-to-day interactions, the way we treat other people and the way 
we expect them to treat us. These understandings of rights and duties are 
not “universal” – they will be very different in different cultural contexts 
– and indeed these “rights” are embedded in culture rather than in law. 
However they represent the way in which most of us live our human rights, 
the way we exercise our rights and the way we respect the rights of others, 
and have much more immediacy for most people than do bills of rights, laws 
and conventions. For this reason there are two important bodies of recent 
literature relevant for human service workers concerned with human rights. 
One is the literature from within the legal profession that is critical of the 
top-down modernist view of law (Douzinas, 2000, 2007 ; Campbell et al., 
2001 ; Rajagopal, 2003), and the other is the newly emerging literature from 
anthropology seeking an anthropological understanding of human rights 
as located in cultures rather than jurisdictions (Goodale and Merry, 2007 ; 
Goodale, 2009). Both these form an important basis for the development of 
ideas of human rights from below.
Understood this way, human rights education or human rights practice 
does not necessarily start with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Rather it can start with people’s own values and experiences, and encour-
age them to think about, and articulate, the rights and duties they would 
wish were applied to all people to make a fairer and more just world. Thus 
universalism becomes aspirational universalism rather than positivist uni-
versalism, and allows people to think about how they understand and realise 
their humanity and the humanity of others.
Such an exploration of humanity and its meaning must resist the 
temptation to universalise, and must accept both the inevitability and the 
desirability of diversity within the human experience. Within this diversity 
there may be some room for universality – we might agree for example that 
all people have the right to be treated with respect and dignity – but what 
that means in practice will vary with cultural context. Working out what 
respect and dignity mean in any community, with its inevitable diversity, 
thus becomes a focus for this kind of human rights work, and can only be 
achieved through genuine participation.
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As noted above, the idea of a “common humanity” has been dominant 
in human rights thinking. However I believe that this is more appropriately 
replaced by the idea of “shared humanity”. This moves away from the idea of 
a single, static entity held in common, and instead allows for a more negoti-
ated and dynamic humanity. Sharing is an active process to which people 
contribute : we give what we can and we take what we need. This can be a 
more powerful way of thinking about our experience of humanity, and is 
consistent with human rights from below in that it allows people more agency.
From this perspective, human rights based work requires an explora-
tion of the human, the sharing of our humanity. This is hardly a new idea 
for social workers, indeed back in the 1980s Ruth Wilkes (1981) was arguing 
strongly that often all we can do for a person is to share our humanity with 
them, but that this is also often the most important thing we can do, and 
must never be devalued by objectivity, targets and performance indicators. 
Central to human rights from below is the importance of dialogue. At 
the heart of dialogue is the idea of reaching out to the other, with respect 
and humility, recognising the other’s humanity and seeking to share one’s 
humanity with the other. The recognition of the ultimate worth of another 
human being, in the encounter between two people, has been seen by Buber 
(1961), Levinas (1972), Irigaray (2008) and others as at the heart of ethics 
and responsibility for the other. It represents a powerful human response, 
as the other makes an ultimate claim on us, and requires us to respond 
with our full humanity (Tascón, 2003). For present purposes, rather than 
seeing this human encounter as the basis of ethics and responsibility (as is 
commonly the case with reviewers of Levinas), I am particularly concerned 
with this “encounter with the other” as central to ideas of human rights. It is 
in our response to the humanity of the other that we recognise their rights, 
and articulate our own rights, not as legal or quasi-legal claims, but as the 
expression of a shared humanity, in relationship.
This encounter is at the heart of human rights from below. Human 
rights from below is built on relationship – dialogical relationship – and how 
this then becomes the basis for our connection to the other through mutual 
rights and responsibilities. However human rights from below requires more 
than the interaction between two people. It is built not simply on dyadic 
relationships, but on community, where more than two people interact with 
each other. For the principles of dialogue, as discussed above, to be applied 
at this broader community level, we are required to respond to others rather 
than just to “the other”, and the principles of approaching an interaction with 
humility, respect and a willingness to learn as well as to teach, are extended 
to a group or communal context. This of course creates additional layers of 
dynamics and relationships, but it is the basis of much of the literature dealing 
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with consensus and non-violent decision making in community groups (e.g. 
Gastil, 1993). Striving for such community interaction, in different contexts, 
therefore represents a key component of human rights from below.
But human rights from below goes further than this, in that it allows for 
diversity, and indeed not only accepts diversity but celebrates it as essential 
for our collective humanity. It also moves human rights beyond the legal 
and political world in which they have largely been confined, to incorporate 
other aspects of the human experience : spirituality, the arts, creativity, the 
experience of nature, and so on. This has largely been lacking from human 
rights work, and human rights courses, yet if human rights are concerned 
with the realisation of our full humanity, it is surely essential.
What does this mean, then, for the project of the democratic renewal 
of practices ? Does human rights provide a basis for practice which seeks 
to challenge the positivist managerial paradigm, from a democratic basis ? 
I would argue that human rights, in its conventional form, has little if any 
potential for such progressive change, as it is too bound up with its tradition 
of Enlightenment modernity and has been too affected by a legal world view 
with its associated positivism and instrumental rationality. This is a major 
weakness in much human rights writing in the human services. However by 
moving away from its Enlightenment legacy, and adopting a stance of human 
rights from below, human rights can indeed represent a powerful basis for 
transformative practice. One of the weaknesses of the traditional human 
rights approach is that it has concentrated too much on the idea of rights, 
and not enough on the idea of human. By starting with the human, working 
on how a truly shared humanity can be realised, and then from there moving 
to develop a community of rights and responsibilities, human rights takes on 
a different colour. Human rights, and their power as a discourse of change 
and social justice in the contemporary world, are too important an idea to 
discard easily. Rather human rights can be reconstructed so that, rather than 
negating participatory democracy, they become inevitably associated with it.
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